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The German political economy, once upheld and admired worldwide as an example of a tamed and coordinated social market economy version of capitalism, is continuing to undergo a process of steady and gradual liberalization, thereby impeding easy and unambiguous categorization. While at the beginning of the new millennium new research in comparative political economy developed the influential varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework​[1]​, based on a binary firm-led typology that distinguished between liberal and coordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs), it is perhaps no coincidence that since then the politics of change in political economy have attracted substantial scholarly attention​[2]​. 
This article argues that such renewed interest in theorizing change is urgently called for, as static characterizations risk obscuring the view for changed ideological and ideational preferences, power resources and institutions. The perhaps overly static VoC framework and indeed much of the comparative political economy literature struggles to account for a combination of changing employer preferences and a neoliberalized cross-party consensus that have spawned a more aggressive pursuit of a bifurcated labour market and sphere of industrial relations, including a low wage segment and segments de facto (and often de jure) outside the regulatory reach of the trade unions. Such bifurcated labour market is not present across all economic sectors and not all sectoral employers welcome this change. However, many do and the  institutional parameters of the old traditional German model​[3]​ are changing, as is the employer commitment to abide by the spirit and not just the letter of what was once a consensus-oriented approach to industrial relations. Given that much change has been employer-driven, the claim that employers cannot get themselves to abandon past positions does not appear to be sustainable​[4]​. 
Empirically, the article contributes to the theme of the special issue on the Federal Republic’ second Grand Coalition (under the Merkel I government) by examining recent changes in the German political economy, focussing primarily on industrial relations, labour market and wage policies during the Grand Coalition of 2005-09. The main thrust of governmental policy during this period was aimed at consolidation. Attempts were made to recalibrate modestly the contested Agenda 2010 reforms of the predecessor government. However, strikingly, some adjustments actually strengthened the punitive character of welfare provision. The long-drawn out debate over the implementation of a minimum wage resulted in a piecemeal sectoral solution that was not influenced by commission work, a decision-making tool that had been employed repeatedly by the Schröder governments. The rest of the article is organised as follows: The second section examines recent scholarly contributions to the changing contours of the German political economy and develops the key arguments, a third section explores empirically changes to labour market and wage policy during 2005-09, while developing the theoretical contentions, and a fourth section succinctly summarises the contributions.   

Ongoing Hybridization: The Fuzzy Contours of the German Political Economy

	The extensive varieties of capitalism literature that has emerged during the past decade robustly rejected the somewhat simplistic convergence claim of the more fatalistic accounts of globalization​[5]​. With the benefit of hindsight it seems obvious that increasing economic transnationalization would be unlikely eo ipso to undermine the structural composition of the highly export-oriented coordinated market economies of northern Europe. In fact, earlier work had stressed the resilience of such neocorporatist export-oriented systems to the economic challenges affecting the West during the 1970s​[6]​.  What some of the earlier globalization literature either muddled or obfuscated altogether was the extent to which economic neoliberal reform was domestically driven, though globalization and the role of European integration could be invoked as useful rhetorical tools of justification, blame avoidance and scapegoating​[7]​. Also, internationalization itself cannot be properly used as an independent variable because it is state-driven​[8]​. But recent research in comparative political economy correctly highlights how poorly the drivers, dynamics and decisive moments of change still remain​[9]​. Scholars critical of the VoC approach have similarly pointed too the excessively static nature of such typology​[10]​ and given the pronounced empirical changes, especially of the presumably paradigmatic CME case Germany, pressing questions about the model’s ”hybridization” emerge​[11]​. 
	Indeed, it proved a struggle to define the rapidly evolving German model decisively. Detailed empirical work without exception chronicled the slow disintegration of established institutions; “the erosion continues​[12]​. More sophisticated accounts of continental European models stress its resilience​[13]​. But it could also be argued that excessive focus on institutions as opposed to policy outcomes obscured the view for the latter becoming increasingly economically liberal, a process termed “functional convergence”​[14]​.  
One of the attempts to salvage VoC categories has been the argument of complementarity​[15]​, that is, the mutually reinforcing nature of subcomponents of different capitalist models, which actors are loathe to tamper with lest the overall consistency of the model be compromised. By the logic of this argument, change would be system-coherent and to some degree path-dependent. However, this concept cannot address the fairly dramatic developments in industrial relations, in particular the rapidly changing institutional dynamics of the employers​[16]​ combined with what now appears to be a permanent embrace of more confrontational tactics and liberal ideology​[17]​. Recent empirical research casts doubt on claims that employers abide by the existing rules and play within largely unaltered institutions. Instead, Verbandsflucht or the exit from employer associations, employer associations making a virtue out of necessity creating new membership categories, geared at members no longer bound to wage agreements (ohne Tarifbindung),  more militant employers, willing to engage in lock-outs as in the eastern German metal sector in 2003 and negotiate with the placid Christian unions of dubious degrees of representation to avoid facing the DGB-affiliated sectoral unions, all point to a more systemic transformation of the employer association over time​[18]​. In Peter Hall’s terms, the employers are embracing both paradigmatic change and change in use of instruments. 

The main contention of this article is that the German political economy is well underway towards a form of hybridization that makes its conceptualization as a CME increasingly problematic. Unlike the predictions of a complementarity-driven and thus conservation-driven strategy, employers pursue a bifurcation of the labour market, with the bottom tier being characterised by low wages, no legal or practical possibility for union activity, and poor working conditions. In empirical terms, the growth of such secondary tier has been advanced through two key channels: firstly, labour migration, more specifically the temporary posting of workers from low wage countries in central and eastern European Union (EU) member states and, secondly, the erosion of sectoral coverage in several low wage service sectors, leading to wildcat agreements between – often non-unionised – employees and employers. At the policy level, the Agenda 2010 social policy reforms have equally contributed to the growth of the secondary tier through four channels. Firstly, the facilitation of employment by temporary work agencies as part of Hartz I in 2003 (Arbeitsnehmerüberlassungsgesetz) has been a factor. Secondly, the raising of the overall tax free level for precarious “mini jobs” of up to 15 hours weekly employment  to 400 euros monthly as part of Hartz II in 2003 created misguided incentives to divide regular jobs into several mini jobs for which employers only incur a 2 percent tax liability. Thirdly, the abolition of the old secondary tier of unemployment compensation (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and the lowering of the overall sum of provisions entailed in social assistance (renamed as Arbeitslosengeld II)  in 2005 as part of Hartz IV has contributed to the lowering of the de facto minimum wage as which social welfare assistance always functions. Fourthly, the massive extension of a “secondary” labour market to entail not only positions within charitable organisations but even private sector companies as long as a “public interest” can be demonstrated, allegedly aimed at improving employability, but in practice linked as a mandatory precondition to the continued receipt of benefits is worth mentioning. Informally known as “one euro jobs”, these “job opportunities with compensation for additional burdens” (Arbeitsgelegenheit mit Mehraufwandsentschädigung) have encouraged the growth of substandard employment, similarly to the mini jobs.  

The comparative business systems literature – to which the comparative political economy owes a sometimes not acknowledged intellectual debt - is somewhat equivocal about the development of hybridization in Germany. Whitly considered such development fairly unlikely​[19]​. Lane correctly sees hybridization as entailing “some change in a path-deviant manner” and identifies German MNCs as drivers of such change internally​[20]​. Recent VoC research suggests that at the meso level, companies might escape institutional limitations imposed by their respective variety by “importation” of underprovided or absent factors, for example highly skilled human resources or start-up venture capital​[21]​.  

But equally absent factors include a low wage service sector which the VoC literature deems redundant or even counterproductive in a business system focusing on incremental change and improvement. Such sector has been created partially due to employer pressure on unions for concessionary bargaining, partially related to public policy reform, partially as an outcome of the eroding institutional coverage of organised industrial relations documented in the literature and partially due to the liberalisation of service provision, which permits the use of flexible detachment of posted workers from low wage central and eastern EU member states. In the absence of a national and often a clearly defined sectoral minimum wage, such outsourcing is highly lucrative.  

Consolidating the Agenda 2010: The Politics of Labour Market Policy during 2005-09

Whatever the preferences of the employers, the politics and policies of the Grand Coalition between 2005-09 regarding the labour market were considerably more modest than those of its predecessor and aimed at the consolidation of the previous major reforms, especially those associated with the Agenda 2010. One possible interpretation of the somewhat bewildering election results of September 2005 is to read them as a popular rejection of the increasingly neoliberal policy course of the Social Democrats. Only four months earlier, Land elections in the “red” heartland” of North Rhine-Westphalia on 22 May 2005 had eliminated the Social Democrats from participation in a government coalition after 39 years. The party lost 5.7 percent of the popular vote. In the aftermath of these regional elections, then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder decided to hold national elections. Taking note of the popular backlash against the Hartz IV reforms in particular, which came into effect on 1 January 2005, the SPD honed in on the so-called “flatrate tax” proposals by the economic advisor to Angela Merkel’s “competence team” Paul Kirchhof​[22]​ as a strategy to profit from popular concern over the Christian Democrats’ business-friendly Leipzig Programme of 2003 that in many ways went well beyond the Agenda 2010.. 
In the federal elections, the SPD lost 4.1 percent of the vote, while the freshly minted Linkspartei improved the score of its predecessor PDS by 4.7 percent. The Christian Democrats similarly lost 3.3 percent of the popular vote, indicating eroding confidence in both of the major parties. 
Without a clear mandate for further liberal reform measures, and arguably a somewhat weak rejection thereof, the Grand-Coalition that emerged on 11 November 2005 after initial talks aimed at a CDU coalition with the Greens and the Free Democrats (the so-called “Jamaica” option) presented an agenda that was neither radically neoliberal nor did it entail major revision of the Agenda 2010. In fact, despite the weaker electoral support and parliamentary position than the Federal Republic’s first Grand Coalition under Kiesinger in the 1960s, some of the harsher measures entailed in the coalition agreements continued in the spirit of the Agenda and finetuned the Hartz reforms. 
A flurry of minor adjustments to labour market and social policy followed, but most seemed to constitute minor tinkering with existing regulations, rather than more radical change. Such outcome was perhaps predictable, given the relatively weak levels of electoral endorsement, the perception that the public was suffering from “reform fatigue” and the departure of the more radical reformist camp within the Social Democrats, aside from Gerhard Schröder himself, principally the self-confessed admirer of Thatcherism Wolfgang Clement. In charge of the combined Ministry of Labour and Economic Affairs between 2002 and 2005, Clement’s increasingly shrill rhetoric in defence of Hartz IV measures and slanderous accusations pointed at recipients of Hartz IV transfer benefits had alienated the traditional clientele of the Social Democrats. That an official report on the state of the labour market in the summer of 2005​[23]​, published by the ministry and endorsed with an introduction penned by the minister himself would employ terminology such as “parasites” – to say nothing of the neo-Victorian main title “Priority for the Decent” – seemed extraordinary, not only because of the tainted Nazi past of the German word.  

Consequently, the Grand Coalition treaded carefully. First minister for the now separate Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was Franz Müntefering, a staunch believer in the neoliberal Agenda 2010, but less abrasive than his predecessor. After stepping down in 2007 for private reasons, Olaf Scholz took over in November 2007, at that point also considered close to the liberal wing within the Social Democrats. The de-merged Ministry of Economic Affairs went to the business-friendly CSU politician Michael Glos. The government professed to address the problem of unemployment, focussing on supply side measures and minor alterations of labour and social policy provision. Contrary to election promises, value added tax was raised from 16 to 19 percent on 1 January 2007. The rise in the retirement age from 65 to 67 had been recommended by the Rürup Commission and was contained in the coalition agreement, but following personal intervention by Müntefering the rise was to be introduced much less gradually, commencing in 2012.   
A major area of attention was the finetuning of the 2005 Hartz IV measures. Originally entitled “Optimisation Act”, the “Act on the Development of Basic Protection for Employment Seekers” (Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende) introduced a number of modifications, along with two modifications of Social Legislation Book II (Sozialgesetzbuch II).  Interestingly, many of the provisions accorded very closely with the employer association’s 31 July 2006 10-point proposal​[24]​; especially regarding tougher provisions for younger recipients. Recipients under 25 years of age will have the income of their parents included in means-testing for their benefit and their establishment of a separate household will require prior approval. In either event, they are eligible for only 80 percent of the level of the regular transfer payment benefit. More stringent requirements regarding individuals cohabiting opened up new room for inspections and imposed the burden of proof on recipients to demonstrate that such co-habitation could not be considered a de facto romantic relationship that would imply financial responsibilities for the partner (Bedarfsgemeinschaft). All institutions involved in making transfer payments were now equipped with inspectors that are entitled to carry out unannounced on-site inspections. First-time applicants to Hartz IV were to be immediately presented with either a job or further training. In case of refusal, it became possible to deny any benefit payment. Similarly, sanctions of up to 60 percent reduction in payment were introduced for recipients found to be in violation of attendant legal responsibilities linked to benefit receipt.  As the new “unemployment compensation II”, introduced as part of Hartz IV was deemed too overshoot the anticipated budget by 3.6 billion euros, a cut in the national insurance contribution to the national fund for the recipients was announced, which will eventually lead to lower pensions for the long-term unemployed. A 22 November 2005 ECJ ruling found the removal of restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts regarding objective grounds and time limits to be discriminatory and in violation of EU Directive 2000/78/EC in terms of the explicit focus on employees above the age of 52. However, rather than eliminating this liberalizing measure or letting the entailed moonshine clause take effect in late 2006, the Grand Coalition agreed to render this removal of restrictions permanent, but rephrase the legislative text in light of the ECJ objections. Other legal challenges included the Federal Constitutional Court objecting to the Arbeitsgemeinschaften in December 2007, regional centres created as part of the Hartz reforms administering claims for unemployment and social compensation. The court criticised the unclear and muddled administrative responsibility of the federal versus local governments respectively and demanded legal clarification to be implemented by 2010. There were few signs of more generosity, including the raising of eastern levels to the higher western rates in the new Länder and, on 1 January 2008, the extension of eligibility for the slightly more generous unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld I) from 18 to 24 months for unemployed of at least 58 years of age who had spent at least the preceding five years in full employment. The latter concession was a result of an initiative by centre-left Kurt Beck at the Hamburg party conference in October 2007 and attracted enough support to override the objections by Müntefering. It was supported by similar suggestions developed by Jürgen Rüttgers, CDU prime minister of North Rhine Westphalia, who criticised the unfair denial of unemployment benefit to older recipients who had made contributory payments for years or even decades​[25]​.   

In addition to some tinkering with aspects of the Agenda 2010, there were also additional measures, including the continuation of the national pact on apprenticeships (Ausbildungspakt), an agreement between employers and government to increase “voluntarily” the number of new apprenticeships in return for the government withdrawing planned legislation sanctioning a punitive levy on companies not offering new slots. The probationary period for new employees – during which statutory protection is limited – was to be extended from six to 24 months. 
In terms of social policy, on 1 January 2007, the Grand Coalition replaced the “parental support payment” (Elterngeld) with an “education support payment” (Erziehungsgeld). Ostensibly designed to substitute regular salaries for new parents and capped at a monthly maximum of 1800 euros, this was in part a reflection of the negative demographic trends and the years of neglect of this policy domain under the Red-Green government. Similarly, the costs for nannies were to be tax-deductible up to a monthly limit of 4000 euros. However, for welfare recipients the new parental support payment de facto meant a reduction in eligibility from two years to one, while the monthly maximum for this group remained unchanged. In the same vein, the children support payment (Kindergeld) was raised on 1 January 2209 by 10 euros a month for the first two children and 16 euros for the third, yet, oddly, this raise was not made available for Hartz IV recipients. The financial amelioration of parenthood was thus not extended to the poorest sections of society.
   


The government was not entirely oblivious to the ongoing bifurcation of the labour market. The Schröder government had responded to considerable popular discontent over EU eastward enlargement by introducing a seven year ban both on labour mobility and transnational service provision from the eastern eight new members. A particular Achilles heel is the absence of a national minimum wage. Sectoral wage agreements are drawn up as the result of regional collective bargaining between unions and employer associations. Given the recent trend of businesses leaving employer associations to avoid the legal obligations such agreements entail, certain service sectors, especially private security, gastronomy and private personal services including hair-dressing witness truly minimal sectoral wages.  In certain sectors, notably meatprocessing, there is no recognised employer association and henceforth no applicable and legally binding sectoral minimum wage. Consequently, from 2004 onwards the posted worker syndrome of the 1990s re-ermerged, this time focused primarily on the meat-processing sector. German companies dismissed regular employees and replaced them with more than 15,000 posted workers from East European subcontractors. Sectoral union Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten (NGG) claims 26,000 job losses as a consequence of the deployment of east European subcontractors, especially from Romania ​[26]​. Remunerated at hourly wage levels of 3 to 5 euros and thus well below standard wage levels, the posting of workers offered the additional advantager of circumventing laws regarding holiday payment, sick payment and contributions to health insurance and social insurance schemes. 





This so-called Posted Workers Act had been amended in 1999 to enable the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs to declare universally applicable wages and working conditions even in the absence of employer consent. Construction sector union IG BAU successfully lobbied for construction-related trades to be covered, including building cleaning, painting, demolition and roofing, while metalworker union IG METALL secured coverage of electricians​[27]​. Somewhat more controversial was the extension to postal services, as the main company in the sectoral employer association Deutsche Post is majority government-owned, attracting criticism from the employer association BDA of undue union influence and political manoeuvring to outflank private competitors​[28]​. The procedural arrangements were successfully challenged in a court case by Deutsche Post’s competitors, reaching the level of the Federal Administrative Court​[29]​. Consequently, the ministry of labour’s declaration of universal applicability of the wage levels negotiated by Deutsche Post and trade union ver.di had been rendered void. 

Not all sectoral employer associations agreed to rendering their sectoral minimum wage universally applicable and umbrella association BDA remained staunchly opposed on ideological grounds to accept the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany​[30]​. Between 2007 and 2008, a major political battle between unions and employers ensued, which was represented respectively by the Social Democratic minister for Labour Olaf Scholz and the Christian Social minister for Economic Affairs Michael Glos within the Grand Coalition. Both camps used their political access channels to the major two political party blocs to lobby actively in this matter​[31]​. The Social Democrats championed the issue to accommodate the significant popular discontent over the Agenda 2010. Only few sectoral employer associations agreed to the legally sanctioned universal applicability of sectoral minimum wages, notably in construction and related fields​[32]​.  
Though an initial compromise seemed to appear during the summer of 2007, it took until July 2008 for a legislative response strategy to emerge that consists of two components: Firstly, the existing national response strategy, the modified 1996 Posted Workers Act, will be amended to permit sectoral minimum wages to be declared universally applicable if at least 50 percent of employees in the sector in question are covered by existing wage agreements and both sectoral unions and employers agree to such measures. Interestingly, such universal applicability can be decreed by government fiat, a notable legal instrument for government intervention. Secondly, a modification of the 1952 Act on Minimum Working Conditions permits the creation of sectoral minimum wages even in sectors in which employer associations either do not exist or possess very low levels of membership. No agreement could be found on whether or not to permit such sectoral minimum wages for the sector of temporary work agencies, where the sectoral employer association remains fiercely opposed at first, though retracting from this opposition somewhat over time​[33]​. However, the CDU remained adamant about not including this sector of the economy, eventually accepting a clause to be inserted into the Temporary Employee Transfer Act (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz) that would cap wage gaps between regular employees and seconded employees of temporary work agencies. The extension of minimal sectoral wages via the Posted Workers Act, however, invited mixed responses from the employers and by the 31 March 2008 deadline set by the ministry, only the aforementioned industrial cleaning sector, the private security service sector, and, interestingly the temporary work agencies sector had registered interest. This led many sectors of the economy with low wage and secondary tier jobs outside of the coverage, including notably agriculture, retail and gastronomy. Controversy over the use of posted workers was to gain impetus in years to come, as the implications of the end to the temporary ban on service provision from Central and Eastern Europe from January 2011 onwards began to be appreciated.    
	
	
Adding to the ongoing debate on the minimum wage problématique was the remarkable ECJ Rüffert ruling, which struck down the obligation imposed on companies tendering for public bids in the Land of Lower Saxony to pay standard regional wages (Tariftreue). In its very liberal ruling, the court found that  « imposer aux prestataires de services établis dans un autre État membre, où les taux de salaire minimal sont inférieurs, une charge économique supplémentaire qui est susceptible de prohiber, de gêner ou de rendre moins attrayante l’exécution de leurs prestations dans l’État membre d’accueil (…) est susceptible de constituer une restriction au sens de l’article 49 CE ». This ruling effectively undermined regional laws aimed at impeding wage dumping in the construction sector and thus rendered the need for a national minimum wage more pressing which would be considered a legitimate component of the ordre public in the way the French minimum wage SMIC is. 
	
	Exacerbating the growth of a secondary tier of the labour market was the trend to agree to “sectoral agreements for…core workforces, while simultaneously weakening them by moving some jobs out of the sector.”​[34]​Worth noting is the growth in so-called mini jobs, exempt from payroll taxation, but also not offering eligibility for welfare state benefits. By 1998, “five million Germans were employed in small jobs, mostly in the service sector” and this trend increased following the implementation of the Hartz reforms, with at least one million new mini jobs emerging in the mid-noughties, at least partially the result of the splitting up of former full time positions​[35]​. A critical union report on new forms of managing the unemployed unearthed that in 2007, of those counted as leaving unemployment by the Federal Labour Office (4,771,302), less than half (1,948,184) re-entered the labour market properly, while more (2,095,249) were either declared unfit to work, forfeited their eligibility, entered early retirement or were simply dropped for unspecified “other reasons”. In relative terms, the situation was nealry identical in 2006, too. For the bottom tier, those receiving Hartz IV, the transition back into the labour market was even more uneven: only 20 percent (or 320,000 individuals) of those counted as leaving Hartz IV status were successfully integrated into regular jobs​[36]​. 

	
Given that 39 percent of the unemployed in 2006 were either unskilled or low skilled, according to the government’s 2006 Annual Economic Report, one redress for unemployment seemed the encouragement of transition into low wage jobs. Consequently, a working group within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was established to examine combining low wages with the receipt of some amount of social benefit (Kombilohn) after the elections in 2005. In 2007, the government initiated no less than five different models of Kombilohn, one aimed at elderly employees (Initiative50plus)in May, followed by a qualification model for young employees and a programme geared at “difficult cases” in October, and, finally, in early 2008 a communal level programme. With these measures, the government followed the recommendations of the working group very closely​[37]​. Other recommendations, including the implementation of a minimum wage, and the discouragement of mini jobs by encouraging welfare recipients to pursue better paid jobs and refrain from employment paying less than 400 euros a month were not immediately followed by legislative option, even though both were also endorsed by the Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat)​[38]​. 

No agreement could be reached on the creation of more company-level dialogue – and perhaps meso level alliances for jobs – as the CDU and employer-backed initiative to enshrine statutorily the favourability principle (Günstigkeitsprinzip), according to which meso level deviations from collectively agreed contracts are permitted if they are to the benefit of employees. In practice, this debate focused on the issue of opening clauses and, more generally, the viability of the system of generally applicable wage contracts, which might have been undermined by permitting excessive company-level deviations and exceptions​[39]​ .  

The labour market policies of the Grand Coalition were thus characterised by consolidating the Hartz reforms of the preceding government, but internal dissent and a perhaps a lack of a clear electoral mandate precluded more radical measures. However, this did not lead to stasis, either. Somewhat disconcertingly, however, was the lack of sustained and substantial activity regarding the decline of full jobs covered by the entire framework of social provisions and the continuing growth of substandard positions. In that sense, the bifurcation of the labour market was not arrested, however, a number of initiatives, notably regarding the introduction of de facto sectoral minimum wages were undertaken, though not particularly successful. 

Conclusion: Consolidation of Past Reforms

	The difficulties of reintegrating “globalisation losers” into the labour market are profound, that is, generating new forms of employment for low skilled workers in a system of political economy that is widely recognised as excelling at high value added high skill production and traditionally entailing disincentives for low wage low productivity employment cannot be easy. It is also worth noting that crude claims about the employers desiring an expanding reserve army of labour are not altogether compelling, given the refusal of the German employers to sanction low skill immigration and concern, rather than enthusiasm in certain sectors​[40]​, notably construction, regarding the implications of EU eastward enlargement.

Nevertheless, the lack of interest of certain sectoral employers in sectoral minimum wages, the vociferous refusal of the BDA and with it the metal sector sectoral employer federation Gesamtmetall to accept a national minimum wage, the employment of eastern European subcontractors and the growth of mini jobs all point to a bifurcation of the labour market based on employer interest that is not adequately captured in much of the comparative political economy literature. An interest in a low wage labour force would seem certainly very unlikely following the categorization of German employers as abiding by the logic of a coordinated market economy. However, the practical observation of a labour market in flux ought to lead to a critical reflection regarding the analytical utility of nationally aggregated employer preferences in general and the preferences assumed by the varieties of capitalism literature in particular. Employers have embraced liberal positions and have abandoned a more consensus-oriented approach. In that sense, one can speak of a paradigmatic shift and a change in the use of existing instruments in Peter Hall’s sense. The Standortdebatte of the 1990s can thus be seen not as a mere rhetorical exercise in influencing public opinion and public policy, but as the beginning of a shifting stance and an embrace of more aggressively liberal positions amongst the employers. 
Thus, while the claim is submitted that a systemic transformation in the employer stance in discernible, such radical change was not visible at the level of the government. The Grand Coalition implemented largely moderate reforms, altering the Hartz IV reforms in some detail, largely in a punitive fashion, yet did not manage to agree to either more radical neoliberal reforms in Schröder’s vein – possibly as a lesson learned from the 2005 electoral results and the abandonment of the Leipzig programme by Merkel – nor did it retract on the Agenda 2010 or implement more substantial social policy re-regulation, such as the implementation of a national minimum wage. By positioning in Schröderites into the ministry of labour and social affairs and with a conservative minister of economic affairs in office, such more politically progressive turn seemed unlikely. That said, Olaf Scholz proved more open to trade union concerns over the minimum wage issue than could have been expected ideologically, yet in practical terms, the minimum wage for the postal sector was clearly implemented to hastily and sloppily that it fell victim to judicial review. Developments in this policy sector can thus be described as modest reforms, that did not entail paradigmatic changes or indeed changes in policy instruments. Given the Christian Democrats’ parliamentary support for the Agenda 2010 during the second  Schröder government, there was bipartisan agreement on the fundamental desirability of the reforms this entailed; consequently, it is difficult to identify clear losers or winners among the two major parties regarding the labour market policy domain. A minor recalibration in favour of elderly employees came, perhaps unexpectedly, from the Christian Democrats, yet it also attracted support from the left of centre elements within the Social Democrats. The overall approach to labour market policy making, a clear focus on the supply side of the economy, was shared across the two major political parties, with little opposition visible from others, with the notable exception of the Left Party. This general stance was discernible also in the response to the financial crisis commencing in the autumn of 2007 and the initial rhetorical rejection of “crass Keynesianism”. In that sense, the general trend in the labour market policy design of Merkel I appeared to be one of consolidation of past reforms, but no major transformation change. Amongst the employers, a consolidated liberal position has now become a more permanent feature, an aspect which appears to be underappreciated in the relevant body of literature thus far.  
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